Showing posts with label regime change. Show all posts
Showing posts with label regime change. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

07-24-12 Activist Newsletter

July 24, 2012, Issue #181
HUDSON VALLEY ACTIVIST NEWSLETTER
jacdon@earthlink.net, P.O. Box 662, New Paltz, NY 12561
http://activistnewsletter.blogspot.com/
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CONTENTS:

1.   WHAT'S REALLY HAPPENING IN SYRIA?
2.   SYRIA: REGIME CHANGE AND SMART POWER
3.   IRAN SANCTIONS — WAR BY OTHER MEANS
4.   THE PENTAGON'S LILY PAD STRATEGY
5.   GET THE FRACK OUTA HERE
6.   THE UNREPORTED ANTI-SEMITISM
7.   A LONG HOT SUMMER
8.   U.S. DENIES MANNING 'NO HARM' DEFENSE
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QUOTE OF THE MONTH — Howard Zinn (1922-2010)

Activist, author and left academic Zinn was best known for writing "A People's History of the United States," but he also made a lifetime of contributions to the struggles for peace, civil rights, and the building of a better society and world. He declared:

"Civil disobedience is not our problem. Our problem is civil obedience. Our problem is that numbers of people all over the world have obeyed the dictates of the leaders of their government and have gone to war, and millions have been killed because of this obedience.... Our problem is that people are obedient all over the world in the face of poverty and starvation and stupidity, and war, and cruelty."
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1.   WHAT'S REALLY HAPPENING IN SYRIA?
By Jack A. Smith, Activist Newsletter

After several months of talking diplomacy while simultaneously strengthening rebel forces in Syria and demonizing the Damascus government, the Obama Administration has openly decided to go for the kill. Violent regime change will not happen immediately, but it is obviously President Obama's goal.

The White House is now "redoubling efforts to rally a coalition of like-minded countries to forcibly bring down the government of President Bashar al-Assad," the New York Times reported July 21. "Administration officials have been in talks with officials in Turkey and Israel over how to manage a Syrian government collapse."

McClatchy Newspapers reported July 23 that "Despite reports last week that suggested rebel forces were on the verge of major triumphs in Syria, the last few days of fighting there show that a long battle still looms. Forces loyal to Assad in recent days have tightened their grip on the Lebanese border, re-established control over at least one neighborhood in Damascus and perhaps reached an accommodation with the country’s Kurds that will free up more troops for battle."

According to the U.S. and its NATO allies, the Damascus regime is engaging in a one-sided, murderous war against its own people, who simply seek democracy. At the same time, the Tehran government is characterized as a "terrorist" regime intent upon building and using nuclear weapons in order to destroy Israel and rule the Middle East. The U.S. news media, as expected, propagates without question Washington's campaign against Syria and Iran.

The United States suggests that its principal reason for seeking regime change in Syria is to promote "democracy" — a tarnished rationale often employed in recent decades to undermine or destroy governments that displease the U.S. superpower, such as in Iran in the 1950s, the Dominican Republic in the 1960s, Chile in the 1970s, Nicaragua in the 1980s, Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Iraq in the 2000s, and Libya in the 2010s, among other instances.

Democracy has nothing to do with Washington's objectives in Syria. America's closest regional ally in the anti-Assad endeavor is the repressive anti-democratic monarchy of Saudi Arabia, which finances and arms the rebel opposition in Syria along with resource-rich Qatar. Both Arab countries played a similar role last year in the U.S./NATO overthrow of the Gaddafi government in Libya.

Having learned a bitter lesson after agreeing to support a no-fly zone in Libya — and seeing that mandate illegally expanded by U.S.-NATO forces in order to wage a vicious war for regime change — both Russia and China have three times exercised their right to veto U.S. measures in the UN to escalate the conflict in Syria. The Security Council approved a 30-day extension of the UN monitor mission July 20, but Susan Rice, Washington's ambassador to the world body, implied it may be the last continuation.

Both Moscow and Beijing seek to bring about a negotiated solution to the crisis based on a cease-fire, talks and reforms. According to  Russian UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin "the only way to put an end to this tragic conflict is to get to the negotiating table." The Syrian government agrees, but the opposition forces — aware that Washington and its allies seek a swift regime change — reject negotiations.

Churkin warns: "Don’t be duped by humanitarian rhetoric. There is much more geopolitics in their [U.S.] policy in Syria than humanism.... Our concern is that the Syrian people have to suffer the consequences of this geopolitical struggle."

There are two principal and interlocking reasons the U.S. and its NATO and Mideast coalition allies are conspiring to oust the Assad government.

(1) The first is to secure Washington's geopolitical position in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), particularly as President Obama prepares to focus additional military and economic resources on East Asia to contain the rise of China, and on Eurasia reduce Russian influence.

British news analysis Patrick Seale, whom we consider an objective source, wrote July 19: "The keys to the Syrian crisis lie outside Syria. Indeed, the Syrian crisis cannot be separated from the massive pressures being put on Iran. President Obama is now fully mobilized against both regimes. He seems to have given up trying to secure a win-win deal with Iran over its nuclear program, and he is sabotaging Kofi Annan’s Syrian peace plan by conniving in the arming of the rebels. He seems to want to bring down the regimes in both Tehran and Damascus — either because he sees Iran as a rival in the Gulf region or to win the favors of Israel’s American supporters in an election year."

According to a July 10 report from Stratfor, the non-government commercial intelligence organization close to certain U.S. spy sources: "Human rights interests alone do not come close to explaining why this particular uprising has received a substantial amount of attention and foreign backing over the past year. The past decade enabled Iran to wrest Baghdad out of Sunni hands and bring Mesopotamia under Shi'ite control. There is little question now that Iraq, as fractured as it is, sits in the Iranian sphere of influence while Iraqi Sunnis have been pushed to the margins. Iran's gains in Baghdad shifted the regional balance of power."

(2) The second reason is to enhance the power of Sunni Islam in MENA and limit possibility of a larger regional role by the Shia Muslim minority.

There are about 2 billion Muslims in the world today. Statistics vary somewhat, but about 87% are said to be Sunnis, and the remainder are Shia — a minority that has suffered discrimination from the majority. Iran has the largest Shia population in the world — up to 95% of its 75 million people. Iraq has the second largest Shia population — over 60% of its 30 million people.

About 87% of the 26 million Syrians are Muslims — 74% of these Sunni and 13% Shia — but members of the Shi'ite Alawite sect, led by the Assad family that dominates Syria's Ba'athist regime, have essentially controlled the country for over 40 years.

The principal Obama Administration target in this complex affair is Iran, not Syria. The Syrian government must fall because it is Iran's main Arab ally (as it also is Russia's, a not insignificant factor). Washington has been intent upon gravely wounding Iran after the Iraq war blew up in its face, resulting in the Shia assumption of power in Baghdad.

Until the 2003 U.S. overthrow of the secular Ba'athist regime in Baghdad led by President Saddam Hussein, Iraq's 30% Sunni minority historically dominated the state. Sunni Iraq was in fact Iran's biggest enemy. President Hussein launched a mutually devastating, unnecessary eight-year war against Iran in 1990 with tacit U.S. support. Now, while not yet an official ally, Baghdad is friendly to Tehran.

President Obama labored long to compel Shia President Nouri al-Maliki to allow tens of thousands of U.S. troops and government "advisers" to remain in Iraq after the bulk of forces were to withdraw at the end of 2011. One purpose was to monitor and reduce future Iranian influence. But the Iraqi leader ultimately refused at the last moment — a huge setback for the administration, though Washington no doubt is continuing its efforts to manipulate Baghdad covertly while crushing Iran's ally in Damascus.

The U.S. now views Iraq as positioned within neighboring Iran's sphere of influence, a significant shift in the regional balance of power. This can only be perceived as a serious danger to American hegemony throughout the region and particularly the Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula, from whence much of the world's petroleum issues. Washington's greatest fear is that Iran and Iraq — two of the world's principal oil producers — might develop a genuine alliance.

This is a chief reason why the Obama government has contrived pretexts to impose heavy sanctions and threaten military action against the Tehran government. This also explains why ultra-conservative Saudi Arabia so enthusiastically backs sanctions and threats against Iran and is investing heavily in overthrowing Assad. The Saudi royal family, devotees of a fundamentalist brand of Sunni religion, wants to expunge Shia influence throughout the region, as well as keep its own discriminated-against 15% Shi'ite minority under tight control.

One pay back for the Saudis is Washington's indifference to the cruelty toward the Shi'ite majority demanding a modicum of democracy in Bahrain, which is ruled by a dictatorial Sunni monarchy under the protection of Saudi Arabia.

Obama's immediate goal is to break up the developing relationship between three contiguous Shia-led countries  — Persian Iran and Arab Iraq and Syria — covering some 1,600 miles from the Afghan border to the Mediterranean.

All other states in MENA circulate well within Washington's hegemonic orbit. The Arab Spring has not diminished U.S. hegemony in the region where regimes were overthrown —Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. Indeed, U.S./NATO control  of Libya and now the Syrian situation appear to have enhanced Washington's regional power. Last week the Arab League, representing all the Arab states, proposed Assad should resign and that the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which leads the armed struggle, should form a transitional regime. Iraq dissented, declaring that it was for the Syrian people alone to decide his fate.

Most Arab countries, and non-Arab NATO member Turkey as well — which flaunts the opportunity to flex its Sunni credentials as it strains to reassert its influence and even leadership in the Middle East — are part of the regime change coalition. Turkey is playing a key role, providing a reliable rear area for the FSA and as a transmission point for arms bound for the opposition.

Even Israel shows public signs of getting directly involved in Assad's downfall. Last week right wing Prime Minister Netanyahu told Fox News Israel "was ready to act" in Syria. Over the years, Tel-Aviv had been more than willing to tolerate the Assad government rather than a Sunni regime until the recent period when Tehran and Damascus began developing much closer ties.

Interestingly, Hamas — the Islamic organization elected to govern the Palestinian territory of Gaza — has recently announced its support for the Sunni rebels in Syria, after receiving decades of solidarity and support from the Assad government. Hamas is connected to the Muslim Brotherhood now leading Egypt which recently guaranteed it would maintain peace and commerce with Israel. Another branch of the Brotherhood is expected to acquire greater political power in Syria if regime change succeeds.

Syria is a strongly nationalist capitalist country which promoted pan-Arabism when it was in vogue in the 1960s. It has been ruled by the Ba'ath Party for over four decades. There are a number of other parties but they are subordinate to the Ba'athists. It is not a western-type democracy and the government is repressive toward dissent. Further, Syria dealt harshly with peaceful demonstrators before the armed opposition was a major factor.

The Damascus government also has positive aspects. The Assad regime is secular in nature, is opposed to colonialism and imperialism, and does not bend the knee — as so do many Arab governments these days — to the U.S. The Assad government strongly opposed America's war in Iraq. It materially and politically backs the rights of the Palestinian people and the Shia Lebanese political party Hezbollah, which is supported by Iran.

In addition, the government appears to have the allegiance of a substantial proportion of the population, including the several minority sects — Christians (10% of the population), Druze, Turkmen, Jews, Yazidis and others. All seem to prefer a secular government to the possibility of a more religious Sunni state, perhaps led by  the Muslim Brotherhood.

The oppositional forces include various often contending civil and exile organizations and individuals associated with the Syrian National Council (SNC), the main opposition group, and the approximately 100 different armed urban guerrilla groups broadly identified with the Syrian Free Army. Disunity characterizes the relations between many of these groups, virtually all of which are Sunni. Major rivalries have been reported between a number of military commanders, and sharp splits have taken place within the SNC and between leaders within Syria and influential exiles largely based in Turkey and Egypt. The U.S. has been working for months to identify and promote the leaders it wishes to put into power.

According to Middle East correspondent Pepe Escobar writing July 24 in Asia Times, "There's no way to understand the Syrian dynamics without learning that most FSA commanders are not Syrians, but Iraqi Sunnis. The FSA could only capture the Abu Kamal border crossing between Syria and Iraq because the whole area is controlled by Sunni tribes viscerally antagonistic towards the al-Maliki government in Baghdad. The free flow of mujahedeen, hardcore jihadis and weapons between Iraq and Syria is now more than established.... As it stands, the romanticized Syrian 'rebels' plus the insurgents formerly known as terrorists cannot win against the Syria military — not even with the Saudis and Qataris showering them with loads of cash and weapons."

Repeated reports from many sources indicate that contingents of fundamentalist jihadists have joined the anti-Assad campaign. Stratfor comments that "The Syrian rebellion contains a growing assortment of Sunni Islamists, Salafist jihadists and transnational al Qaeda-style jihadists. Foreign fighters belonging to the latter two categories are believed to be making their way into Syria from Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq." 

According to a report this week in the German daily Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
German intelligence estimates that "around 90" terror attacks that "can be attributed to organizations that are close to al-Qaeda or jihadist groups" were carried out in Syria between the end of December and the beginning of July.

Even the New York Times, a vigorous proponent of overthrowing Assad had to acknowledge July 25 that "evidence is mounting that Syria has become a magnet for Sunni extremists, including those operating under the banner of Al Qaeda.,,, Al Qaeda, through an audio statement, has just made an undisguised bid to link its insurgency in Iraq with the revolution in Syria, depicting both as sectarian conflicts — Sunnis versus Shi'ites."

Despite such attacks, the Damascus government announced this week that it would not use its chemical weapons "against the Syrian people or civilians during this crisis, under any circumstances.” It did, however, suggest it might deploy such weapons against foreign military intervention.

In the U.S. most liberals and Democrats support Obama's Syrian adventure as well Republicans, just as they approved of what little they knew of the White House involvement in the Libyan regime change.  GOP candidate Mitt Romney and some Republican politicians demand "tougher action," but that's just for show.

Sectors of the U.S. left are split over America's role in Syria. Some groups support the uprising in the name of democracy, ignoring that Washington and the royal family in Riyadh will be the biggest winners. Those who identify with the anti-imperialist perspective strongly oppose U.S/Saudi involvement. (1)

Our view is that it is the responsibility of the people of a country, such as Syria — and not outside forces — to determine the political character of their government, up to and including armed revolution.

And the anti-Assad international coalition is not just any "outside force." It takes orders from the United States — the most powerful military state in the world responsible for violent aggression and millions of deaths in recent decades —  and is also backed by a couple of anti-democratic monarchies and NATO, including two of the region's former colonial overlords, France and Great Britain.

The extent of American involvement with the opposition was partially exposed by the New York Times July 21: "American diplomats are also meeting regularly with representatives of various Syrian opposition groups outside the country to help map out a possible post-Assad government. 'Our focus with the opposition is on working with them so that they have a political transition in place to stand up a new Syria,' Patrick Ventrell, a State Department spokesman, said last week."

As such, in our understanding, the  principal aspect of the struggle for power in Syria is not popular forces fighting for democracy but an international coalition led by imperialism seeking to overthrow a government allied to Iran in order to serve Washington's geopolitical objectives and Saudi Arabia's sectarian goal of diminishing Shia influence in the region.

— Readers interested in the left debate may wish to read the article  "Cruise Missile Socialists" by By Mazda Majidi, putting forward an anti-imperialist argument against the U.S.-led overthrow of Assad. It is at
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=31957
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2.   SYRIA: REGIME CHANGE AND SMART POWER
[This article casts additional light on the Syrian situation, elaborating on Turkey's role in the plans for regime change in Damascus. It appeared in Asia Times July 23. The author, Ambassador M. K. Bhadrakumar, was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.]

By M. K. Bhadrakumar

Israel's emergence from the woodwork can signal only one thing: the Syrian crisis is moving towards the decisive phase. The lights have been switched on in the operation theatre and the carving of Syria is beginning. What is going to follow won't be a pretty sight at all since the patient is not under anesthesia, and the chief surgeon prefers to lead from behind while sidekicks do the dirty job.

So far, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have done the maximum they could to destabilize Syria and remove the regime headed by President Bashar al-Assad. But Assad is still holding out. Israeli expertise is now needed to complete the unfinished business.

Someone is needed to plunge a sharp knife deep into Assad's back. Jordan's king can't do the job; he measures up only to Assad's knees. The Saudi and Qatari sheikhs with their ponderous, flabby body are not used to physical activity; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization prefers to be left alone, having burnt its fingers in Libya with a bloody operation that borders on war crime. That leaves Turkey.

In principle, Turkey has the muscle power, but intervention in Syria is fraught with risks and one of the enduring legacies of Kemal Atatürk is that Turkey avoids taking risks. Besides, Turkey's military is not quite in top form.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is also unable to carry the majority opinion within Turkey in favor of a war in Syria, and he is navigating a tricky path himself, trying to amend his country's constitution and make himself a real sultan. Obviously, Erdogan can't risk his career.

Besides, there are imponderables — a potential backlash from the Alawite minority within Turkey (which resents the surge of [extreme fundamentalist] Salafism under Erdogan's watch) and the perennial danger of walking into a trap set up by militant Kurds.... The Alawites in Turkey see Assad "trying to hold together a tolerant, pluralist Syria.

But all that is becoming irrelevant. The New York Times reported July 20, quoting American officials in Washington, that President Barack Obama is "increasing aid to the rebels and redoubling efforts to rally a coalition of like-minded countries to forcibly bring down the [Syrian] government."

It further reported that the CIA operatives who are based in southern Turkey "for several weeks" will continue with their mission to create violence against the Syrian regime. Meanwhile, the U.S and Turkey will also be working on putting together a post-Assad "provisional government" in Syria.

Accordingly, the leaders of Syria's proscribed Muslim Brotherhood held a four-day conclave in Istanbul and announced plans July 20 to create an "Islamic party." The Brotherhood's spokesman announced, "We are ready for the post-Assad era, we have plans for the economy, the courts, [and] politics."

The emergent operational plan is that while Ankara steps up the covert operations inside Syria (bankrolled by Saudi Arabia and Qatar), Israel will cross the border into Syria from the south and attack Assad's military and degrade its capacity to resist the Turkish threat.

Turkey has stepped up the psywar, projecting through the media that the Syrian regime is already tottering....

But such accounts also reflect the Turkish establishment's worry that the Syrian regime is still not showing signs of capitulation despite all the hits it took from the "rebels."

Erdogan's best hope is that the Turkish intelligence could orchestrate some sort of "palace coup" in Damascus in the coming days or weeks. What suits Ankara will be to have Assad replaced by a transitional structure that retains elements of the existing Ba'athist state structure, which could facilitate an orderly transfer of power to a new administration — that is to say, ideally, a transition not different from what followed in Egypt once Hosni Mubarak exited.

But Erdogan is unsure whether Turkey can swing an Egypt-like coup in Damascus. His dash to Moscow July 18 aimed at sounding out Russia if a new and stable transitional structure could be put together in Damascus through some kind of international cooperation. (Obama lent his weight to Erdogan's mission by telephoning Russian President Vladimir Putin the next day to discuss Syria.)

Just before Erdogan went into his scheduled meeting with Putin in the Kremlin, a massive terrorist attack took place in Damascus, killing the Syrian defense minister and its intelligence chief. In the event, Moscow politely heard him out and assured Erdogan it would make a clinical separation between Russia's long-term strategic ties with Turkey and the Syrian issue. At any rate, the Russian stance remained unchanged, as evident from its veto at the United Security Council a week later....

Prior to the Moscow visit, Erdogan also traveled to Beijing, which senses that the U.S. is closing the deal on Syria. The official Global Times newspaper commented in an editorial July 20 that "It's likely that the Assad administration will be overthrown...."

In the final analysis, only Israel can resolve Erdogan's dilemma. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak stated over the weekend, "Syria has advanced anti-aircraft missiles, surface-to-surface missiles and elements of chemical weapons. I directed the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] to prepare for a situation where we will need to consider the possibility of an attack."

Barak added that the "moment [Assad] starts to fall, we [Israel] will conduct intelligence monitoring and will liaise with other agencies." He spoke after a secret visit to Israel the previous weekend by Obama's National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon. Close on the heels of Donilon's consultations, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Tel Aviv after a historic meeting in Cairo with the newly elected President Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, who assured Washington that he wouldn't contemplate creating any problems for Israel in a conceivable future.

Barak's disclosure tears apart the thin veil of indifference that Tel-Aviv so far maintained over the Syrian developments. What emerges, in retrospect, is that Washington kept Israel in abeyance for the ripe moment to physically demolish Assad's war machinery, an enterprise that Erdogan is unwilling or incapable of undertaking.

Most certainly, Erdogan was in the loop that he was going to partner Barak, but being a shrewd politician he kept up an appearance of agonizing publicly over the Syrian crisis —while, of course, covertly fueling it.

Simply put, Washington has outwitted Moscow and Beijing. It kept assuring Russia and China that a military intervention by the U.S. all by itself or a Libya-style NATO operation was the last thing on Obama's mind. No doubt, Obama kept its word.

What is unfolding is a startling sight — Salafism riding the wings of the Israeli air force and landing in Damascus. Erdogan will now set out with renewed vigor to shake up the Assad tree in Damascus, while any day from now Barak will begin chopping off the tree's branches in a lightning sweep.

Erdogan and Barak will make the Assad tree so naked and helpless that it will realize the futility of standing upright any more. There is no "military intervention" involved here, no NATO operations, no Libya-like analogy can be drawn. Nor is Erdogan to order his army to march into Syria.

Secretary of State Clinton would say this is the [use of] "smart power." In a magnificent essay titled "The Art of Smart Power" penned by her last week as she surveyed the curious twist to the tale of the Arab Spring, Clinton wrote that the U.S. is nowadays "leading in new ways." [1]

Clinton underscored that Washington is expanding its "foreign-policy toolbox [to] integrate every asset and partner, and fundamentally change the way we [U.S.] do business .... [The] common thread running through all our efforts is a commitment to adapt America's global leadership for the needs of a changing world."

At the end of the day, Erdogan will bite the bullet. The plain truth is that Israel is going to complete the messy job for him in Syria.

Erdogan has no choice but to accept that he belongs to Washington's "toolbox" — nothing more, nothing less. He was never destined for the role to lead the Muslim Middle East. The West was merely pandering to his well-known vanity. That role is Washington's exclusive prerogative.

Note: 1. The art of smart power, New Statesman, July 18, 2012, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/07/hillary-clinton-art-smart-power
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3.   IRAN SANCTIONS — WAR BY OTHER MEANS
By Conn Hallinan

Now that talks with Iran on its nuclear program appear to be on the ropes, are we on the road to war? The Israelis threaten it almost weekly, and the Barack Obama administration has reportedly drawn up an attack plan. But in a sense, we are already at war with Iran.

Carl von Clausewitz, the great theoretician of modern warfare, defined war as the continuation of politics by other means. In the case of Iran, international politics has become a de-facto state of war. According to reports, the annual inflation rate in Iran is 22.2%, although many economists estimate it at double that. In the last week of June, the price of chicken rose 30%, grains were up 55.8%, fruits up 66.6%, and vegetables up 99.5%. Iran's Central Bank estimates unemployment among the young is 22.5%, although the Financial Times says "the official figures are vastly underestimated". The production sector is working at half its capacity.

The value of the Iranian rial has fallen 40% since last year, and there is a wave of business closings and bankruptcies due to rising energy costs and imports made expensive by the sanctions.

Oil exports, Iran's major source of income, have fallen 40% in 2012, according to the International Energy Agency, costing the country nearly U.S.$32 billion over the past year. The 27-member European Union ban on buying Iranian oil will further depress sales, and an EU withdrawal of shipping insurance will make it difficult for Tehran to ship oil and gas to its diminishing number of customers. Loss of insurance coverage could reduce Iran's oil exports by 200,000 barrels a day, or $4.5 billion a month. Energy accounts for about 80% of Iran's public revenues.

Whipsawed by energy sanctions, the worst may be yet to come. The United States has already made it difficult for countries to deal with Iran's Central Bank, and the U.S. Congress is considering legislation that would declare the Iranian energy sector a "zone of proliferation concern," which would strangle Tehran's ability to collect payments for its oil exports. Other proposals would essentially make it impossible to do business with Iran's other banks. Any country that dared to do so would find itself unable to conduct virtually any kind of international banking.

If the blizzard of legislation does pass, "this would be a significant ratcheting-up of the economic war against Iran," Mark Dubowitz told the Financial Times. Dubowitz is executive director of the neo-conservative Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, which has lobbied for a series of economic assaults against the Palestinians, China, and Hezbollah.

But the "war" has already gone far beyond the economic sphere.

In the past two years, five Iranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated. The hits have been widely attributed to the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, and the People's Mujahidin of Iran (MEK), an organization the U.S. State Department designates as "terrorist."

Last year, a massive explosion rocked the Bid Ganeh military base near Tehran, killing 17 people, including the founder of Iran's missile program, Gen. Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam. According to Israeli media, the camp was sabotaged by the MEK working with Mossad. Deadly attacks directed at Iran's Revolutionary Guard have been tied to Jundullah, a Sunni group with ties to U.S. and Israeli intelligence.

It is no secret —indeed, President Obama openly admitted it — that under the codename "Olympic Games" the United States has been waging cyber war against Iran. The Stuxnet virus shut down a considerable portion of Iran's nuclear program, although it also infected infrastructure systems, including power plants, oil rigs, and water supplies. The virus was designed to attack systems made by the German company Siemens and has apparently spread to China, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

The United States is also suspected of being behind the Flame virus, a spyware program able to record keystrokes, eavesdrop on conversations near an infected computer, and tap into screen images. Besides Iran, Flame has been found in computers in the Palestinian West Bank, Lebanon, Hungary, Austria, Russia, Hong Kong, and the United Arab Emirates. Because "malware" seeks out undefended computers no matter where they are, it has a habit of spreading beyond its initial target.

Most of the media is focused on whether the failure of the talks will lead to an Israeli or American attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, and there is certainly considerable smoke out there.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak have been threatening to attack Iran for the past two years. According to Gideon Rachman, a leading columnist for the Financial Times, some Israeli officials have told him Tel Aviv will attack sometime this summer or early fall. One source told him "Israel will wait until September or October because the weather is better and it's closer to the U.S. elections."

But the Independent's (UK) Patrick Cockburn, one of the more reliable analysts on the Middle East, thinks the Israeli threats are "the bluff of the century." Cockburn argues that there is simply no reason for Tel-Aviv to go to war, since the Iranian economy is being effectively strangled by the sanctions. But the saber rattling is useful because it scares the EU into toughing up the siege of Tehran, while also shifting the Palestinian issue to a back burner.

There are serious divisions within Israel on whether to go to war, with Israeli intelligence and the military generally opposed. The latter's reasons are simple: militarily Tel-Aviv couldn't pull it off, and politically an attack would garner worldwide sympathy for Iran. Recent statements downgrading the threat of Iran by Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz suggest the Netanyahu government is finally feeling the pressure from divisions within its own ranks and may be backing off from a military confrontation.

And the United States? According to Paul Rogers, a Department of Peace Studies professor at Bradford University and OpenDemocracy's international security editor, the Pentagon has drawn up plans for a concentrated attack on Iran's nuclear industry, using a combination of bombers and cruise missiles. The United States recently beefed up its military footprint in the region.

But while the possibility of such an attack is real — especially if congressional hawks get their way — the Pentagon and the U.S. intelligence establishment are hardly enthusiastic about it. In any case, the United States is carpet-bombing Iran's economy without firing a shot or sending air crews into harm's way.

Although Iran is generally depicted as the recalcitrant party in the current nuclear talks, it has already compromised extensively, even agreeing to ship some of its enriched uranium out of the country and to guarantee the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to all nuclear facilities. Tehran has also converted one-third of its 20%-enriched uranium into plates, making it almost impossible to use the fuel for nuclear weapons. Weapons-grade uranium is enriched to 90%.

In return, Tehran is demanding the right to enrich to 3.5% — the level needed to power a civilian reactor — and an end to sanctions.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not ban enriching uranium — indeed, it is guaranteed by Articles III and IV — as long as the fuel is not weaponized. "Iran is raising eyebrows," says Yousaf M. Butt of the American Federation of Scientists, "but what it is doing is a concern — not illegal."

However, the P5+1 — the permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany — is demanding an end to all enrichment, an Iranian commitment to ship the enriched fuel out of the country, and closure of the enrichment plant at Fordo: "stop, shut, and ship."

In return, Iran would get enriched fuel for medical use and some spare parts for its civilian airlines. The sanctions would remain in place, however, although it would open the subject up for discussion. The problem is that many of the more onerous sanctions are those independently applied by the United States and the EU. Russia and China have expressed opposition to the independent sanctions, but so far have not shown a willingness to openly flaunt them.

It will be hard for Tehran to make further concessions, particularly if there is no light at the end of the sanction tunnel. Indeed, some of the demands seem almost crafted to derail a diplomatic solution, raising the suspicion that the dispute is less about Iran's nuclear program than a concerted drive to marginalize a country that has resisted European and U.S. interests in the Middle East. Isolate Iran enough, the thinking goes, and it might bring about regime change. Moscow and Beijing don't support such an outcome, but they have little influence over what Washington and Brussels do independently.

There is still no evidence that Iran is trying to build nuclear weapons. Indeed, the body of evidence suggests the opposite, including the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate that Tehran mothballed its program in 2003. But evidence is irrelevant when the enormous economic power of the United States and the EU can cow the rest of the world, and force a country to its knees without resorting to open hostilities.

In short, war by other means.

— Originally published at Dispatches From the Edge, July 15. Hallinan is a columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus.
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4.    THE PENTAGON'S LILY PAD STRATEGY
By David Vine

The first thing I saw last month when I walked into the belly of the dark grey C-17 Air Force cargo plane was a void -- something missing. A missing left arm, to be exact, severed at the shoulder, temporarily patched and held together.  Thick, pale flesh, flecked with bright red at the edges. It looked like meat sliced open. The face and what remained of the rest of the man were obscured by blankets, an American flag quilt, and a jumble of tubes and tape, wires, drip bags, and medical monitors.

That man and two other critically wounded soldiers -- one with two stumps where legs had been, the other missing a leg below the thigh -- were intubated, unconscious, and lying on stretchers hooked to the walls of the plane that had just landed at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. A tattoo on the soldier’s remaining arm read, “DEATH BEFORE DISHONOR.”

I asked a member of the Air Force medical team about the casualties they see like these. Many, as with this flight, were coming from Afghanistan, he told me. “A lot from the Horn of Africa,” he added. “You don’t really hear about that in the media.”

“Where in Africa?” I asked.  He said he didn’t know exactly, but generally from the Horn, often with critical injuries. “A lot out of Djibouti,” he added, referring to Camp Lemonnier, the main U.S. military base in Africa, but from “elsewhere” in the region, too.

Since the “Black Hawk Down” deaths in Somalia almost 20 years ago, we’ve heard little, if anything, about American military casualties in Africa (other than a strange report last week about three special operations commandos killed, along with three women identified by U.S. military sources as “Moroccan prostitutes,” in a mysterious car accident in Mali). The growing number of patients arriving at Ramstein from Africa pulls back a curtain on a significant transformation in twenty-first-century U.S. military strategy.

These casualties are likely to be the vanguard of growing numbers of wounded troops coming from places far removed from Afghanistan or Iraq. They reflect the increased use of relatively small bases like Camp Lemonnier, which military planners see as a model for future U.S. bases “scattered,” as one academic explains, “across regions in which the United States has previously not maintained a military presence.”

Disappearing are the days when Ramstein was the signature U.S. base, an American-town-sized behemoth filled with thousands or tens of thousands of Americans, PXs, Pizza Huts, and other amenities of home. But don’t for a second think that the Pentagon is packing up, downsizing its global mission, and heading home. In fact, based on developments in recent years, the opposite may be true. While the collection of Cold War-era giant bases around the world is shrinking, the global infrastructure of bases overseas has exploded in size and scope.

Unknown to most Americans, Washington’s garrisoning of the planet is on the rise, thanks to a new generation of bases the military calls “lily pads” (as in a frog jumping across a pond toward its prey). These are small, secretive, inaccessible facilities with limited numbers of troops, spartan amenities, and prepositioned weaponry and supplies.

Around the world, from Djibouti to the jungles of Honduras, the deserts of Mauritania to Australia’s tiny Cocos Islands, the Pentagon has been pursuing as many lily pads as it can, in as many countries as it can, as fast as it can. Although statistics are hard to assemble, given the often-secretive nature of such bases, the Pentagon has probably built upwards of 50 lily pads and other small bases since around 2000, while exploring the construction of dozens more.

As Mark Gillem, author of America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire, explains, “avoidance” of local populations, publicity, and potential opposition is the new aim. “To project its power,” he says, the United States wants “secluded and self-contained outposts strategically located” around the world. According to some of the strategy’s strongest proponents at the American Enterprise Institute, the goal should be “to create a worldwide network of frontier forts,” with the U.S. military “the ‘global cavalry’ of the twenty-first century.”

Such lily-pad bases have become a critical part of an evolving Washington military strategy aimed at maintaining U.S. global dominance by doing far more with less in an increasingly competitive, ever more multi-polar world. Central as it’s becoming to the long-term U.S. stance, this global-basing reset policy has, remarkably enough, received almost no public attention, nor significant Congressional oversight. Meanwhile, as the arrival of the first casualties from Africa shows, the U.S. military is getting involved in new areas of the world and new conflicts, with potentially disastrous consequences.

You might think that the U.S. military is in the process of shrinking, rather than expanding, its little noticed but enormous collection of bases abroad. After all, it was forced to close the full panoply of 505 bases, mega to micro, that it built in Iraq, and it's now beginning the process of drawing down forces in Afghanistan. In Europe, the Pentagon is continuing to close its massive bases in Germany and will soon remove two combat brigades from that country. Global troop numbers are set to shrink by around 100,000.

Yet Washington still easily maintains the largest collection of foreign bases in world history: more than 1,000 military installations outside the 50 states and Washington, DC. They include everything from decades-old bases in Germany and Japan to brand-new drone bases in Ethiopia and the Seychelles islands in the Indian Ocean and even resorts for military vacationers in Italy and South Korea.

In Afghanistan, the U.S.-led international force still occupies more than 450 bases. In total, the U.S. military has some form of troop presence in approximately 150 foreign countries, not to mention 11 aircraft carrier task forces -- essentially floating bases -- and a significant, and growing, military presence in space. The United States currently spends an estimated $250 billion annually maintaining bases and troops overseas.

Some bases, like Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, date to the late nineteenth century. Most were built or occupied during or just after World War II on every continent, including Antarctica. Although the U.S. military vacated around 60% of its foreign bases following the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Cold War base infrastructure remained relatively intact, with 60,000 American troops remaining in Germany alone, despite the absence of a superpower adversary.

However, in the early months of 2001, even before the attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration launched a major global realignment of bases and troops that’s continuing today with Obama’s “Asia pivot.” Bush’s original plan was to close more than one-third of the nation’s overseas bases and shift troops east and south, closer to predicted conflict zones in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Pentagon began to focus on creating smaller and more flexible “forward operating bases” and even smaller “cooperative security locations” or “lily pads.” Major troop concentrations were to be restricted to a reduced number of “main operating bases” (MOBs) -- like Ramstein, Guam in the Pacific, and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean -- which were to be expanded.

Despite the rhetoric of consolidation and closure that went with this plan, in the post-9/11 era the Pentagon has actually been expanding its base infrastructure dramatically, including dozens of major bases in every Persian Gulf country save Iran, and in several Central Asian countries critical to the war in Afghanistan.

Obama’s recently announced “Asia pivot” signals that East Asia will be at the center of the explosion of lily-pad bases and related developments. Already in Australia, U.S. marines are settling into a shared base in Darwin. Elsewhere, the Pentagon is pursuing plans for a drone and surveillance base in Australia’s Cocos Islands and deployments to Brisbane and Perth. In Thailand, the Pentagon has negotiated rights for new Navy port visits and a “disaster-relief hub” at U-Tapao.

In the Philippines, whose government evicted the U.S. from the massive Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in the early 1990s, as many as 600 special forces troops have quietly been operating in the country’s south since January 2002. Last month, the two governments reached an agreement on the future U.S. use of Clark and Subic, as well as other repair and supply hubs from the Vietnam War era. In a sign of changing times, U.S. officials even signed a 2011 defense agreement with former enemy Vietnam and have begun negotiations over the Navy’s increased use of Vietnamese ports.

Elsewhere in Asia, the Pentagon has rebuilt a runway on tiny Tinian island near Guam, and it’s considering future bases in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, while pushing stronger military ties with India. Every year in the region, the military conducts around 170 military exercises and 250 port visits. On South Korea’s Jeju island, the Korean military is building a base that will be part of the U.S. missile defense system and to which U.S. forces will have regular access.

“We just can’t be in one place to do what we’ve got to do,” Pacific Command commander Admiral Samuel Locklear III has said. For military planners, “what we’ve got to do” is clearly defined as isolating and (in the terminology of the Cold War) “containing” the new power in the region, China. This evidently means “peppering” new bases throughout the region, adding to the more than 200 U.S. bases that have encircled China for decades in Japan, South Korea, Guam, and Hawaii.

And Asia is just the beginning. In Africa, the Pentagon has quietly created “about a dozen air bases” for drones and surveillance since 2007. In addition to Camp Lemonnier, we know that the military has created or will soon create installations in Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Sudan, and Uganda. The Pentagon has also investigated building bases in Algeria, Gabon, Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria, among other places.

Next year, a brigade-sized force of 3,000 troops, and “likely more,” will arrive for exercises and training missions across the continent. In the nearby Persian Gulf, the Navy is developing an “afloat forward-staging base,” or “mothership,” to serve as a sea-borne “lily pad” for helicopters and patrol craft, and has been involved in a massive build-up of forces in the region.

In Latin America, following the military's eviction from Panama in 1999 and Ecuador in 2009, the Pentagon has created or upgraded new bases in Aruba and Curaçao, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, and Peru.  Elsewhere, the Pentagon has funded the creation of military and police bases capable of hosting U.S. forces in Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Costa Rica, and even Ecuador. In 2008, the Navy reactivated its Fourth Fleet, inactive since 1950, to patrol the region. The military may want a base in Brazil and unsuccessfully tried to create bases, ostensibly for humanitarian and emergency relief, in Paraguay and Argentina.

Finally, in Europe, after arriving in the Balkans during 1990’s interventions, U.S. bases have moved eastward into some of the former Eastern Bloc states of the Soviet empire. The Pentagon is now developing installations capable of supporting rotating, brigade-sized deployments in Romania and Bulgaria, and a missile defense base and aviation facilities in Poland. Previously, the Bush administration maintained two CIA black sites (secret prisons) in Lithuania and another in Poland. Citizens of the Czech Republic rejected a planned radar base for the Pentagon’s still unproven missile defense system, and now Romania will host ground-based missiles.

A lily pad on one of the Gulf of Guinea islands of S­Ã£o Tomé and Príncipe, off the oil-rich west coast of Africa, helps explain what’s going on. A U.S. official has described the base as “another Diego Garcia,” referring to the Indian Ocean base that’s helped ensure decades of U.S. domination over Middle Eastern energy supplies. Without the freedom to create new large bases in Africa, the Pentagon is using S­Ã£o Tomé and a growing collection of other lily pads on the continent in an attempt to control another crucial oil-rich region.

Far beyond West Africa, the nineteenth century “Great Game” competition for Central Asia has returned with a passion -- and this time gone global.  It’s spreading to resource-rich lands in Africa, Asia, and South America, as the United States, China, Russia, and members of the European Union find themselves locked in an increasingly intense competition for economic and geopolitical supremacy.

While Beijing, in particular, has pursued this competition in a largely economic fashion, dotting the globe with strategic investments, Washington has focused relentlessly on military might as its global trump card, dotting the planet with new bases and other forms of military power. “Forget full-scale invasions and large-footprint occupations on the Eurasian mainland,” Nick Turse has written of this new twenty-first century military strategy. “Instead, think: special operations forces... proxy armies... the militarization of spying and intelligence... drone aircraft... cyber-attacks, and joint Pentagon operations with increasingly militarized ‘civilian’ government agencies.”

Add to this unparalleled long-range air and naval power; arms sales besting any nation on Earth; humanitarian and disaster relief missions that clearly serve military intelligence, patrol, and “hearts and minds” functions; the rotational deployment of regular U.S. forces globally; port visits and an expanding array of joint military exercises and training missions that give the U.S. military de facto “presence” worldwide and help turn foreign militaries into proxy forces.

And lots and lots of lily-pad bases.

Military planners see a future of endless small-scale interventions in which a large, geographically dispersed collection of bases will always be primed for instant operational access. With bases in as many places as possible, military planners want to be able to turn to another conveniently close country if the United States is ever prevented from using a base, as it was by Turkey prior to the invasion of Iraq. In other words, Pentagon officials dream of nearly limitless flexibility, the ability to react with remarkable rapidity to developments anywhere on Earth, and thus, something approaching total military control over the planet.

Beyond their military utility, the lily pads and other forms of power projection are also political and economic tools used to build and maintain alliances and provide privileged U.S. access to overseas markets, resources, and investment opportunities. Washington is planning to use lily-pad bases and other military projects to bind countries in Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America as closely as possible to the U.S. military -- and so to continued U.S. political-economic hegemony. In short, American officials are hoping military might will entrench their influence and keep as many countries as possible within an American orbit at a time when some are asserting their independence ever more forcefully or gravitating toward China and other rising powers.

While relying on smaller bases may sound smarter and more cost effective than maintaining huge bases that have often caused anger in places like Okinawa and South Korea, lily pads threaten U.S. and global security in several ways:

First, the “lily pad” language can be misleading, since by design or otherwise, such installations are capable of quickly growing into bloated behemoths.

Second, despite the rhetoric about spreading democracy that still lingers in Washington, building more lily pads actually guarantees collaboration with an increasing number of despotic, corrupt, and murderous regimes.

Third, there is a well-documented pattern of damage that military facilities of various sizes inflict on local communities. Although lily pads seem to promise insulation from local opposition, over time even small bases have often led to anger and protest movements.

Finally, a proliferation of lily pads means the creeping militarization of large swaths of the globe. Like real lily pads -- which are actually aquatic weeds -- bases have a way of growing and reproducing uncontrollably. Indeed, bases tend to beget bases, creating “base races” with other nations, heightening military tensions, and discouraging diplomatic solutions to conflicts. After all, how would the United States respond if China, Russia, or Iran were to build even a single lily-pad base of its own in Mexico or the Caribbean?

For China and Russia in particular, ever more U.S. bases near their borders threaten to set off new cold wars. Most troublingly, the creation of new bases to protect against an alleged future Chinese military threat may prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy: such bases in Asia are likely to create the threat they are supposedly designed to protect against, making a catastrophic war with China more, not less, likely.

Encouragingly, however, overseas bases have recently begun to generate critical scrutiny across the political spectrum from Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison and Republican presidential candidate Ron Paul to Democratic Senator Jon Tester and New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof. With everyone looking for ways to trim the deficit, closing overseas bases offers easy savings. Indeed, increasingly influential types are recognizing that the country simply can’t afford more than 1,000 bases abroad.

Great Britain, like empires before it, had to close most of its remaining foreign bases in the midst of an economic crisis in the 1960s and 1970s. The United States is undoubtedly headed in that direction sooner or later. The only question is whether the country will give up its bases and downsize its global mission by choice, or if it will follow Britain’s path as a fading power forced to give up its bases from a position of weakness.

Of course, the consequences of not choosing another path extend beyond economics. If the proliferation of lily pads, special operations forces, and drone wars continues, the United States is likely to be drawn into new conflicts and new wars, generating unknown forms of blowback, and untold death and destruction. In that case, we’d better prepare for a lot more incoming flights -- from the Horn of Africa to Honduras -- carrying not just amputees but caskets.

— This article was posted July 15 on TomDispatch.com. David Vine is an assistant professor of anthropology at American University in Washington, DC. He is the author of "Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia" (Princeton University Press, 2009). He has written for the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Guardian, and Mother Jones, among other places. He is currently completing a book about the more than 1,000 U.S. military bases located outside the United States.
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5.   GET THE FRACK OUTA HERE
Written by Bev Grant and Daniel A. Weiss,
performed by Ina May Wool and Bev Grant.
[You can listen to this at the Labor Notes website at
http://labornotes.org/2012/05/get-frack-outa-here]

Gas man came calling just the other day.
Said you lease me your land and I promise we will pay
For what you got underground; we’ll bring it to the top.
But first we gotta drill a hole, make those bubbles pop.
We got a cocktail to inject. Best not to drink it, don’t you know.
We’ll shoot it deep inside the shale rock shatter what’s below,

To get the natural gas.
Your lucky day will come at last,
When we frack over here.

My neighbor told me he got that same song and dance.
The money sounded good and so he thought he’d take a chance.
Now his chickens lost their feathers, some are now belated,
‘Cause the water in his well has been contaminated.
Strike a match in his sink, watch the faucet catch on fire.
The gas man says it’s not his fault. We know he’s no liar.

Natural gas,
Hope this don't sound too crass.
Get the frack outa here

Between a rock and a hard place, that's where I am.
Lord knows we need the money, but I don’t understand.

How you can stand there and tell me, this is a good thing,
While you poison our water with lead and benzene.
Hydraulic fracturing, sure, it's making you a buck,
While the rest of us get sick and die and you just say “tough luck.”
You try to make us think it’s safe. You even try to say it’s green.
By showing pretty pictures on our tv screen.

Natural gas,
You can kiss my ass.
Get the frack outa here.

Ain’t nothin’ natural ‘bout your
Natural gas,
Kiss my natural ass, and
Get the frack outa here.

[Personnel: Bev Grant, vocals, acoustic guitar; Ina May Wool, vocals; Daniel A. Weiss, dobro, Trilian bass, mandolin, drum programming, sound, producer.]
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6.   THE UNREPORTED ANTI-SEMITISM
[The following article, originally titled "Tens of thousands of people live in the shadow of terror," is by Amira Hass, a writer for the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz, where it appeared July 18.]

Here's a statistic that you won't see in research on anti-Semitism, no matter how meticulous the study is. In the first six months of the year, 154 anti-Semitic assaults have been recorded, 45 of them around one village alone. Some fear that last year's record high of 411 attacks —  significantly more than the 312 attacks in 2010 and 168 in 2009 —  could be broken this year.

Fifty-eight incidents were recorded in June alone, including stone-throwing targeting farmers and shepherds, shattered windows, arson, damaged water pipes and water-storage facilities, uprooted fruit trees and one damaged house of worship. The assailants are sometimes masked, sometimes not; sometimes they attack surreptitiously, sometimes in the light of day.

There were two violent attacks a day, in separate venues, on July 13, 14 and 15. The words "death" and "revenge" have been scrawled in various areas; a more original message promises that "We will yet slaughter."

It's no accident that the diligent anti-Semitism researchers have left out this data. That's because they don't see it as relevant, since the Semites who were attacked live in villages with names like Jalud, Mughayer and At-Tuwani, Yanun and Beitilu. The daily dose of terrorizing (otherwise known as terrorism ) that is inflicted on these Semites isn't compiled into a neat statistical report, nor is it noticed by most of the Jewish population in Israel and around the world —  even though the incidents resemble the stories told by our grandparents.

The day our grandparents feared was Sunday, the Christian Sabbath; the Semites, who are not of interest to the researchers monitoring anti-Semitism, fear Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath. Our grandparents knew that the order-enforcement authorities wouldn't intervene to help a Jewish family under attack; we know that the Israel Defense Forces, the Israel Police, the Civil Administration, the Border Police and the courts all stand on the sidelines, closing their eyes, softballing investigations, ignoring evidence, downplaying the severity of the acts, protecting the attackers, and giving a boost to those pogromtchiks. The hands behind these attacks belong to Israeli Jews who violate international law by living in the West Bank. But the aims and goals behind the attacks are the flesh and blood of the Israeli non-occupation. This systemic violence is part of the existing order. It complements and facilitates the violence of the regime, and what the representatives —  the brigade commanders, the battalion commanders, the generals and the Civil Administration officers —  are doing while "bearing the burden" of military service.

They are grabbing as much land as possible, using pretexts and tricks made kosher by the High Court of Justice; they are confining the natives to densely populated reservations. That is the essence of the tremendous success known as Area C: a deliberate thinning of the Palestinian population in about 62% of the West Bank, as preparation for formal annexation.

Day after day, tens of thousands of people live in the shadow of terror. Will there be an attack today on the homes at the edge of the village? Will we be able to get to the well, to the orchard, to the wheat field? Will our children get to school okay, or make it to their cousins' house unharmed? How many olive trees were damaged overnight?

In exceptional cases, when there is luck to be had, a video camera operated by B'Tselem volunteers (1) documents an incident and pierces the armor of willful ignorance donned by the citizens of the only democracy in the Middle East. When there is no camera, the matter is of negligible importance, because after all, you can't believe the Palestinians. But this routine of escalating violence is very real, even if it is underreported.

For the human rights organization Al-Haq (2), the escalation is reminiscent of what happened in 1993-1994, when they warned that the increasing violence, combined with the authorities' failure to take action, would lead to mass casualties. And then Dr. Baruch Goldstein of Kiryat Arba came along and gunned down 29 Muslim worshipers at the Ibrahim Mosque. The massacre set the stage for a consistent Israeli policy of emptying the Old City of Hebron of its Palestinian residents, with the assistance of Israeli Jewish pogromtchiks. Is there someone among the country's decision-makers and decision-implementers who is hoping for a second round?

(1) B'Tselem is the name of the volunteer civil organization titled "The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories."  They have an informative website, including a number of one-the-spot videos of rights violations at http://www.btselem.org/video
(2) Al-Haq is an independent Palestinian non-governmental human rights organization based in Ramallah, West Bank. The web address: http://www.alhaq.org/.
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7.   A LONG HOT SUMMER
By Bill McKibben

It's turning into a hot climate summer in two ways, only one of which you can measure with a thermometer.

Amidst the deepening drought, the summer's fourth heat wave, and the continued western fires, there's something else breaking out: a siege of citizen uprisings at key points around the country all designed to keep coal in the hole, oil in the soil, gas... underground.

Ever since the mass arrests protesting the Keystone pipeline last summer (the largest civil disobedience action in the U.S. in 30 years) there's been renewed interest in confronting the fossil fuel industry and its political enablers. Some have been following this path for years, of course -- late next week, beginning July 25, opponents of mountain-top removal coal-mining will resume their long-standing (and increasingly successful fight), with a week-long Mountain Mobilization that will likely include civil disobedience.

A few days later, activists from around the country will descend on D.C. for a rally against fracking -- perhaps the fastest-growing wing of the environmental movement. That gathering won't lead to arrests -- but others will.

Earlier this week, for instance, Ohio protesters chained themselves to the gates outside a so-called injection well, not far from where earlier this year disposal of fracking water had helped trigger a swarm of earthquakes. And just yesterday Josh Fox and Mark Ruffalo announced plans for an August 25 gathering designed to keep fracking at bay in New York State.

From August 10-20, Montana protesters will hold a multi-day sit-in designed to stop opening up of massive new coal mines -- and across the Pacific Northwest others are joining in to fight the proposed ports that would send that coal to Asia for burning.

And just so oil doesn't feel left out of the party, Texans in August and September are planning civil disobedience to block the southern leg of the Keystone XL pipeline, the part that's been given a green light by the Obama administration.

Taken one by one, these might seem like mosquito bites against the tough hide of the planet's richest and most politically connected industry. But taken together, they show an ever-savvier movement that's figuring out the choke points that make fossil fuel corporations vulnerable. If you can't pipe tar sands oil to the ocean, there's no reason to mine it in the first place; if you've got no port for your coal, you might as well leave it in the ground.

And here's the thing -- each of these actions is magnified by the temperature, multiplied by the humidity, underscored by the smoke in the sky. "Long hot summer" has two meanings now, and they amplify each other.

— From Common Dreams, July 19. Bill McKibben teaches at Middlebury (VT) College and is co-founder of 350.org. His most recent book is "Eaarth: Making a Life on a Tough New Planet." McKibben's other new article, "Global Warming's Terrifying New Math," has been published in Rolling Stone and is available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying-new-math-20120719?print=true
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8.   U.S. DENIES MANNING 'NO HARM' DEFENSE
By the Bradley Manning Support Network

FORT MEADE, Maryland: Establishing yet another obstacle for PFC Bradley Manning's legal defense, military judge Denise Lind ruled July 19 that defense lawyer David Coombs will be substantially hindered from showing how WikiLeaks' releases didn’t bring damage to U.S. national security. In largely granting a government motion to preclude discussion of actual damage, Lind said that harm or lack thereof is irrelevant to Manning’s guilt or innocence.

"Bradley should be able to argue that he had a reasonable belief that no harm would come from his alleged actions by showing that no harm actually occurred," explained Jeff Paterson of the Bradley Manning Support Network.  The prosecution continues to argue that the releases “could” cause harm at some point in the future.

Manning's next hearing at Fort Meade, Aug. 27-31, will highlight the illegal and torturous treatment the military subjected him to at the Quantico Marine Base in Virginia. Coombs is expected to argue for dismissal of all charges based on the military's flagrant violation of Article 13 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that prohibits all pre-trial punishment "any more rigorous" than required to ensure the accused appears at court hearings.

Judge Lind ruled July 20 that she would not allow United Nations torture rapporteur Juan Mendez to testify about Manning's unlawful confinement conditions, declaring his testimony irrelevant, even though the torture chief called Manning's treatment "cruel, inhuman, and degrading" after a 14-month investigation

Supporters will underscore the cruelty of Manning's conditions by holding a rally at the Fort Meade Main Gate on Aug. 27.

—The Support Network address is http://www.bradleymanning.org.
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Sunday, July 12, 2009

Activist Newsletter July 12, 2009

WHAT REALLY JUST HAPPENED IN IRAN?
By Jack A. Smith
July 12, 2009, Hudson Valley Activist Newsletter

1. QUESTIONS and CONTEXT

What really just happened in Iran? The dramatic demonstrations that followed the June 12 contested reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have raised more questions than they answered.

Three questions in particular stand out: (1) What is the struggle actually about? (2) Was the election rigged, as charged by the leading opposition candidate, Mir Hussein Mousavi, and his vocal supporters? (3) Did the U.S. play a role leading up to the protests in quest of an outcome similar to the so-called color revolutions Washington enabled in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan?

The Western mass media have described Iran's contested election and its bitter aftermath as an uprising of the masses to transform the Islamic Republic into a democratic republic, or at least to propel the country into the pro-Western camp. Some publications were already calling it the "Green Revolution" or the "Green Wave," after the color of Mousavi's campaign paraphernalia.

In reality, the struggle is the product of a sharp internal clash between the two conservative coalitions that rule Iran. As Mousavi made clear in a recent public statement: "We are not against our sacred regime and its legal structures; this structure guards our independence, freedom, and Islamic Republic."

As for Ahmadinejad, writer Azmai Bishara described him this way at MRZine June 26: "Ahmadinejad is less a representative of Iranian conservatives than a rebel against them from within their own establishment. He has lashed out against them, including corrupt clergy, using the principles of the Islamic revolution as his weapons. He is a conservative of the fundamentalist stripe and wants to restore the revolution to its youthful vigor and gleam."

At issue in this internal struggle, which is now calming down as the sides reassess their situations, are differences on economic, religious, and social questions, and serious cultural conflicts, which we shall detail below.

The American media and much of the liberal press clearly side with the "good" Mousavi faction against the "evil" Ahmadinejad and seem convinced that the election was a fraud, or a "coup" engineered by the incumbent president involving the theft of millions of votes. As yet there is no concrete evidence of massive electoral malfeasance, a matter we shall discuss later in this article.

Washington insists the U.S. government is innocent of involvement in events leading up to the Iranian election and the social melee that followed. As yet there is only suggestive evidence of an American connection, though this must be coupled with a record of over a half century of interference in Iranian affairs.

Indirect involvement, however, is well documented. For instance, a few years ago the Bush Administration launched a congressionally funded project within Iran to undermine the Teheran government and build an anti-regime opposition within the country — a program that has continued into the Obama Administration. And this is just one of many overt and covert instances of current U.S. actions to destabilize the Iranian government.

President Barack Obama has not specifically accused the Tehran government of stealing the election — either because the U.S. knows Ahmadinejad won, as this writer imagines it does, or doesn't know who won. The extensive American intelligence apparatus has been working overtime to investigate the election. If it found believable evidence of mass fraud, it would hardly conceal the news.

The president did point out June 23, however, that "a sizable percentage of the Iranian people themselves... consider this election illegitimate…. There [are] significant questions about the legitimacy of the election."

As an aside we must note a certain hypocrisy in the U.S. practice of criticizing elections in countries that are considered America's enemies, overlooking obvious illegalities in friendly-country elections (as in Egypt), or the lack of elections for leadership posts (as in Saudi Arabia), and condemning and refusing to recognize winners of democratic elections who attract Washington's wrath (as in Gaza).

The official vote count was 63.3% for Ahmadinejad and 34.2% for Mousavi. The two other candidates were Mohsen Rezaei, a founder of the Revolutionary Guards, with 2%, and Mullah Mehdi Karroubi, a former speaker of the Parliament, who received less than 1%

Obama has strongly criticized the regime's response to the intense street demonstrations, which press reports said drew millions of people over the two weeks following the voting. He charged that "the violence perpetrated against them is outrageous," as though there was no violence from a sector of the demonstrators in the first days of protest.

Iranian authorities state that there was violence on the part of both the demonstrators (20 were killed) and the security forces (eight died). The regime arrested some 2,500 people in the aftermath of the election, but released 2,000 of them by July 8; the remainder are going to trial. Human Rights Watch charged that a number of detainees had been mistreated.

President Ahmadinejad took exception to Obama's criticism in a speech last week: "Didn't he [Obama] say that he was after change [in relations with Iran]? Why did he interfere? Why did he utter remarks irrespective of [diplomatic] norms and decorum?"

President Obama made it clear this week, despite muted criticism about the elections, that the U.S. remained ready to engage in two-party negotiations with the Iranian government about Teheran's nuclear program and other matters. The Bush Administration was disinclined to participate in direct talks, openly working to undermine the Tehran government and for a time was prepared to attack Iran.

Obama, through his "New Beginning" campaign in the Middle East, is proving to be quite effective so far in presenting a less aggressive and considerably more rational American image than that shot into the region like a cannon ball by his neoconservative predecessor. But there is no doubt he is pursuing similar objectives with different means.

First, Obama desires a nuclear agreement acceptable to the U.S. and Israel, but through the mechanism of improved bilateral relations and conventional coercion, in place of bullying and war cries. In the longer term, the Obama Administration still seeks regime change — though preferably the "softer" version — resulting in the extension of American hegemony into Iran for the first time in the three decades since Washington's underling, the Shah of Iran, was dispatched by the Islamic Revolution.

While Obama embraces diplomacy and calls for friendlier relations between Washington and Tehran, the next two highest administration officials have been making declarations designed to disparage and threaten Iran.

On July 7, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared to a Venezuelan TV network that "We would ask the world to join us in imposing even stricter sanctions on Iran to try to change the behavior of the regime…. We have seen in the last weeks that Iran has not respected its own democracy. It has taken actions against [its] own citizens for peacefully protesting…. I think it is not a very smart position to ally with a regime that is being rejected by so many of their own people."

Clinton was actually undermining two countries on Washington's hit list — Venezuela as well as Iran. She was telling a Venezuelan TV audience (and Latin America in general) to oppose efforts by President Hugo Chavez to establish warm relations with Iran.

On July 5, Vice President Joseph Biden announced that Israel has a right, as a sovereign nation, to launch an unprovoked attack on Iran, strongly suggesting that the U.S. would not stand in its way. This has been interpreted as a typical Biden faux pas, but we think it was a warning to Tehran that it best make big concessions at the nuclear talks, or else.

Two days later, while noting that Biden simply "stated a categorical fact," Obama said the White House had "absolutely not" given Israel permission to bomb Iran. He declared, "We have said directly to the Israelis that it is important to try and resolve this in an international setting in a way that does not create major conflict in the Middle East." Obama has the power to forbid a preemptive Israeli attack, but decided to keep the threat alive by merely not authorizing it.

In June, Clinton declared gratuitously that not only would the U.S. massively retaliate against Iran were it to attack Israel, but warned that one or another unspecified country might launch a preemptive war again Iran. The Teheran government has not threatened war against Israel, but Tel Aviv for the last year has repeatedly suggested it might launch an attack against Iran should it be able to produce a nuclear weapon.

And on June 19, the House of Representatives voted 405-1 to throw its total support to the post-election demonstrators and to demand that Iran "stop all violent and unjust actions against its own people."

2. THE BACKGROUND

Some background will be useful before digging deeper into the election, its aftermath and the question of U.S. involvement. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been on or near the top of Washington's enemies list for 30 years, ever since the Iranian Revolution toppled the oppressive monarchy of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The Shah was installed on the Peacock Throne by the U.S. and Great Britain in 1953 after they engineered a successful coup against the democratically elected secular government of progressive Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, which had ended the monarchy and nationalized Iran's petroleum resources. Pahlavi was a servant of U.S. interests in the Middle East for almost 26 years. He saw to it that some 60% of Iranian oil went to American companies.

Washington has never forgiven the Iranian revolutionaries for ousting the dreaded Pahlavi. His value to the U.S. was enormous, as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in his memoirs:

"Under the Shah's leadership, the land bridge between Asia and Europe, so often the hinge of world history, was pro-American and pro-West without any challenge…. Iran's influence was always on our side…. Iran under the Shah, in short, was one of America's best, most important, and most loyal friends in the world." The monarch was, to speak plainly, a U.S. puppet.

In his June 4 Cairo address calling for a New Beginning in U.S. relations with the Muslim world, President Obama noted that "In the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government." The U.S. continued to lie about its involvement in the bloody coup for 47 years until Secretary of State Madeline Albright finally admitted in 2000 that "the United States played a significant role" in this imperial adventure, noting that "it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs."

Neither Obama nor Albright apologized or offered compensation for a deed that smashed Iranian democracy and ushered in over a quarter-century of a vicious monarchy protected by the U.S. followed by three decades of a conservative theocracy. Ahmadinejad earlier this year said that if the U.S. wants to improve relations it should apologize for its "dark history and crimes" against Iran.

The lack of an apology is nothing new in U.S. relations with Iran. On July 3, 1988, the U.S. Navy's guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian passenger airliner off the coast of Iran over the Strait of Hormuz, killing 290 passengers and crew, including 65 children. The Navy claimed it mistook the huge Airbus A300B2 for an incoming jet fighter, which of course has an entirely different configuration.

Vice President George H.W. Bush, then in the midst of his run for the presidency in August of that election year, was asked whether he was going to apologize for the tragedy. He responded: "I will never apologize for the United States of America. I don't care what the facts are." The captain of the Vincennes was honored with the Legion of Merit when the cruiser's tour of duty ended.

Washington has sought to isolate and, if possible, overturn the revolutionary regime in Tehran ever since it took power in early 1979, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini — a leading Shi'ite cleric in a deeply religious society. The U.S. broke diplomatic relations and imposed economic and trade sanctions against Iran soon after the Shah was deposed. In 1980, Washington secretly backed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's aggressive invasion of Iran, a conflict that caused an immense loss of life and material damage before it ended in a stalemate in 1988. Washington supplied Iraq with satellite information about Iran's deployments and materials for chemical-biological warfare.

In 1987 President Ronald Reagan strengthened sanctions against Iran allegedly because it was a "state sponsor of terrorism." In 1995, the Clinton Administration further toughened anti-Iran sanctions after Israel claimed Teheran was building nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration gratuitously identified Iran as a cohort of the "Axis of Evil" in 2002 and a couple of years later came perilously close to subjecting Iran to another of its unjust wars for "democracy," i.e., for oil and hegemony. Had the subjugation of Iraq gone as planned, instead of the military and political disaster that transpired, Iran probably would have been next on the U.S. regime-change agenda.

Operating as usual in tandem with U.S. foreign policy, the corporate mass media have demonized and caricatured President Ahmadinejad, 52, since he was first elected in 2005. As a general rule, extreme caution is required to evaluate foreign political leaders who have been the target of continual White House criticism and disparagement. We think of President Slobodan Miloseviç of Yugoslavia and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq in this regard — both of whom were characterized as beastly incarnations of Hitler as a prelude to Washington's military aggression in 1999 and 2003.

The Bush Administration spent years mocking and "Hitlerising" Ahmadinejad while contemplating if and when to launch a war. It's always a "good war" to fight a Hitler, and the U.S. public is easily fooled every time the old devil is contrived to have reappeared.

Decades of U.S. enmity toward Iraq were concisely captured by journalist Chris Hedges in an article for TruthDig June 22 titled Iran Had Democracy Before we Took it Away:

"I do not remember Iran orchestrating a coup in the United States to replace an elected government with a brutal dictator who for decades persecuted, assassinated and imprisoned democracy activists. I do not remember Iran arming and funding a neighboring state to wage war against our country. Iran never shot down one of our passenger jets as did the USS Vincennes — caustically nicknamed Robocruiser by the crews of other American vessels — when in June 1988 it fired missiles at an Airbus filled with Iranian civilians, killing everyone on board. Iran is not sponsoring terrorism within the United States, as our intelligence services currently do in Iran. The attacks on Iranian soil include suicide bombings, kidnappings, beheadings, sabotage and 'targeted assassinations' of government officials, scientists and other Iranian leaders. What would we do if the situation was reversed? How would we react if Iran carried out these policies against us?"

Most Americans know little if anything about Iran except Washington's negative views, but there have been some interesting social advances in this country of 70 million people.

Since the revolution, writes Professor Ervand Abrahamian of Baruch College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, "the Islamic Republic — despite its poor image abroad — has taken significant steps toward fulfilling" promises "to create a full-fledged welfare state — in its proper European, rather than derogatory American, sense…. It has done so by giving priority to social rather than military expenditures, and thus dramatically expanding the Ministries of Education, Health, Agriculture, Labor, Housing, Welfare and Social Security. The military consumed as much as 18% of the gross domestic product in the last years of the Shah. Now it takes up as little as 4%....

"The regime has come close to eliminating illiteracy among the post-revolutionary generations, reducing the overall rate from 53% to 15%. The rate among women has fallen from 65% to 20%. The state has increased the number of students enrolled in primary schools from 4,768,000 to 5,700,000, in secondary schools from 2.1 million to over 7.6 million, in technical schools from 201,000 to 509,000, and in universities from 154,000 to over 1.5 million. The percentage of women in university student populations has gone up from 30% to 62%. Thanks to medical clinics, life expectancy at birth has increased from 56 to 70, and infant mortality has decreased from 104 to 25 per 1,000... [and] the fertility rate — the average number of children born to a woman in her lifetime — from 7 to 3. It is expected to fall further to 2 by 2012." (The full article is in the Spring 2009 issue of Middle East Report. It is at http://www.merip.org/mer/mer250/abrahamian.html.)

3. THE POLITICAL PLAYERS

In the election, President Ahmadinejad, a civil engineer and a former mayor of Tehran, was backed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a sector of the Shia clergy, nearly all the security forces, a large proportion of the working class, lower middle class and the poor, small business owners, and the "second generation" revolutionaries who fought in the war with Iraq —an important part of his political base. This is a large constituency, capable in our view of producing an electoral majority.

Khamenei, 70, is the most powerful figure in the Iranian state, far more so than President Ahmadinejad. He was president 1981-89, after which he was named supreme leader following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, who led the Islamic Revolution.

In Iran, the supreme leader, who is always a leading Shi'ite cleric, is the country's principal religious and political authority and is considered the ultimate head of the Islamic Republic, including of the government and the armed forces. A supreme leader, of which there have been two so far, is selected by an Assembly of Experts — a body of 89 Islamic scholars who supervise the leader's work and have the power to remove him. The scholars are elected by the public every eight years from a screened list of candidates. The leader also appoints six of the 12 members of the powerful Guardian Council (which interprets the constitution and supervises elections), the influential Friday prayer leaders, and the heads of radio and TV. He also confirms the election of Iran's presidents.

The losing candidate, Mousavi, 67, served as prime minister (1981-89) before the post was eliminated. He is said to have liberal tendencies within the context of conservative reform. Since leaving politics, he worked as an architect and painter and now is president of the Iranian Academy of Arts. He is backed by such leading political figures as former Presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (who presided 1989-1997) and Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005). Rafsanjani, a mullah and a billionaire businessman, ran again in 2005 and was beaten by Ahmadinejad, who received 62% of the vote (a shade lower than his official total this June). Mass support for Mousavi comes from political groups characterized by reformism and "pragmatic conservatism," a considerable sector of the clergy, much of the big business and corporate community, the educated urban middle class, upper middle class, college students, and modern women seeking greater gender freedoms.

Rafsanjani, 75, a leading oligarch with powerful connections, is the key figure behind Mousavi and bankrolled his campaign, though he has lately kept a low profile and calls for social calm. He is the big loser in the election. Ahmadinejad was sharply critical of him during the campaign, characterizing the former president as corrupt, which many happen to believe. He is presently the chairman of the Assembly of Experts, which puts him in a position to exercise substantial influence in an organization capable of dismissing the supreme leader. Khamenei, however, has recently defended Rafsanjani, even against Ahmadinejad's strong criticism, so the supreme leader is secure in his position. A majority of the Assembly came out on Khamenei's side in late June, declaring that "enemies of Iran" were behind the riots.

4. IRANIAN POLITICS

In discussing the political situation in Iran it is important to understand there's a world of difference between the thrust of Tehran's internal policies and external policies. Internally, Iranian governance is conservative, particularly in the cultural realm, and heavily influenced by the Shi'ite branch of Islam. Externally, in foreign affairs, the policy tends to be radical and anti-imperialist.

Iran may be dominated by conservative clerics but the masses of people do take part in political life and determine the outcome of elections. Government policies frequently derive from a consensus of the differing views of many political parties and organizations, often at the behest of the supreme leader.

A circumscribed form of democracy exists within the country, giving rise to two principal political blocs — conservatism (with a fairly populist economic program, interestingly enough), and reformism (in this instance an essentially conservative tendency seeking modest reforms). The leading religious and secular figures within or supporting these two blocs constitute most of the Iranian ruling class.

The Islamic left, which at one time was considered strong, now exists in reduced circumstances, but its members were at the demonstrations.

The political left was strong, too, but was largely destroyed or exiled — first in the events around the 1953 anti-democratic coup; second throughout the Shah's brutal reign; and third by the Islamic government, especially during the 1980s when it is estimated that 20,000 progressives, socialists, communists and others were slain or executed. At the time the president and prime minister who presided over this slaughter were, respectively, the now Supreme Leader Khamenei and reform leader Mousavi, the losing candidate.

From the point of view of the Iranian Marxist left, underground or in exile, neither of the two principal coalitions represents the interests of the working class. If there was a serious socialist alternative Ahmadinejad's working class base would be far smaller. By and large, it is reported, the workers did not join the protest demonstrations.

There are a number of political parties and organizations in Iran, most of whom ally with one or the other bloc during presidential elections. The Iranian parliament is called the Majlis. According to a June 24 article in Time Magazine online, "Currently, Ahmadinejad's coalition controls 117 of the 290 seats in the Majlis, while the reformists control 46 and pragmatic conservatives aligned with Rafsanjani and Mousavi have 53. Five seats are reserved for religious minorities, and 69 are in the hands of independents, among whom the opposition will presumably be lobbying hard for support against the President."

Complexities abound when discussing Iranian politics because the context and political alliances are quite different in the Islamic Republic compared to America's democratic republic. For example, an important political aspect of the election, unmentioned in most Western press accounts despite its critical importance, was the fact that "Ahmadinejad ran his re-election campaign against the old clerical elite, charging them with corruption, luxurious living and running the state for their own benefit rather than that of the people," according to a June 29 article by Stratfor's George Friedman. "When Ahmadinejad defeated Mousavi on the night of the election, the clerical elite saw themselves in serious danger. The margin of victory Ahmadinejad claimed might have given him the political clout to challenge their position."

This could partly explain why a number of clerics and leading ayatollahs in a country largely ruled by the religious establishment have been criticizing the election results and supporting Mousavi's contention of vast electoral impropriety. A good part of Ahmadinejad's popular support is based on his opposition to clerical privileges and dishonesty, and on his strong stand on national security matters, given that the country has long been in the gun sights of both the U.S. and Israel, and also because Iran suffered tremendously from the eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s.

Many millions of Iranians are not principally devoted to one bloc or another but to the existence of the Islamic Republic itself, and they participate in elections to advance the candidate who will insure the health of the state. They are part of the ideological base of the republic and are loyal to Khamenei. Others, from liberals to Marxists, desire extensive political changes that are not on the agenda in today's Iran. We assume many showed up at the demonstrations to press their points and push the struggle forward, regardless of whether the election was rigged or not. It was an opportunity to agitate for change while masses were in motion against the oppressive state.

The struggle between conservative Ahmadinejad and reformist Mousavi — or perhaps more properly between Supreme Leader Khamenei and former Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami — is not about changing the essential features of a theocratic state with certain democratic options. They both are committed to the maintenance of the Islamic Republic and to the revolutionary constitution promoted by the late Ayatollah Khomeini.

President Obama frankly observed June 16 that "The difference in actual policies between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi… may not be as great as advertised. I think it's important to understand that either way we are going to be dealing with a regime in Iran that is hostile to the U.S." It must be noted here that Iran's "hostility" was hardly generated in a vacuum, but is the product of decades of American threats, punishment and subversion.

Here, in the brief outline, are some of the differences that separate the two ruling blocs, both of which, incidentally, are devoted to capitalism, the development of nuclear energy as a power source, the rights of the Palestinian people, the Islamic state, and opposition to U.S. imperialism.

Ahmadinejad is considered to be on the political right wing but tends to be more attentive to the needs of the working class than the more moderate conservative opposition. He promoted a populist economic policy, including social programs for the masses, easy loans for farmers, food subsidies for low income people, and reductions in bank interest rates, among other measures. His bloc, however, is extremely conservative regarding cultural, religious, and certain civil liberties issues. On the other hand it supports a vigorous anti-imperialist foreign policy, is defiant toward U.S. and Israeli pressure, and stands up to the European Union when it acts against Iranian interests; it is friendly toward countries that treat it fairly, such as Venezuela, Russia, and Syria among many others, and supports (Shi'ite) Hezbollah in Lebanon and (Sunni) Hamas in Palestine. Ahmadinejad wants improved relations with the U.S. but not at the expense of core concessions.

Writing in Antiwar.com June 24, former CIA officer Philip Giraldi — who long warned that the Bush Administration was contemplating an attack on Iran — underscored the popularity of Ahmadinejad's public condemnation of wrongdoing by the clergy when he pointed to "the corrupt Iran of the post-revolutionary period when the country was looted by the senior clerics cooperating with the business class, the bazaaris. Some intelligence sources believe that Ahmadinejad, who has been demonized by the Western media, is actually the reformer in that he has taken on the country's pervasive corruption with the full support of… the supreme leader. Massive corruption has been business as usual in Iran, frequently managed by politicians who have called themselves reformers."

Actually, according to M.K. Bhadrakumar writing in Asia Times June 23, "Ahmadinejad's principal weakness is his failure to bring the rich and corrupt mullahs to justice, as he had promised. His supporters say that would be the priority in his second term."

The Mousavi reform bloc is less populist, and seems to lean toward neoliberalism, integrating the Iranian economy into the world market system and opening to foreign investment. The reformers are critical of Ahmadinejad for what it terms his economic failures, inflation and "handouts" to the workers and the poor. The reformers are liberal on cultural and civil liberties issues — from a more relaxed dress code for women to freer speech. It is critical of the U.S. and Israel, though not with Ahmadinejad's intensity. The group's middle and upper middle class backers seem more attracted to Western society; and its big business supporters, plus a sector of the clergy, wish to integrate far more into the globalized international capitalist economy, which inevitably means making some concessions to end Washington's economic and trade sanctions. Reformists also seek to reduce some of the powers of what has been called "the most influential body in Iran" — the Guardian Council, which has to approve all bills passed by parliament and has the power to veto them if it considers them inconsistent with the constitution and Islamic law.

Left analyst James Petras summarized the differences between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi June 18 by examining the voting patterns: "The demography of voting reveals a real class polarization pitting high income, free market oriented, capitalist individualists against working class, low income, community based supporters of a 'moral economy' in which usury and profiteering are limited by religious precepts. The open attacks by opposition economists of the government welfare spending, easy credit and heavy subsidies of basic food staples did little to ingratiate them with the majority of Iranians benefiting from those programs. The state was seen as the protector and benefactor of the poor workers against the 'market', which represented wealth, power, privilege and corruption. The Opposition's attack on the regime's 'intransigent' foreign policy and positions 'alienating' the West only resonated with the liberal university students and import-export business groups. To many Iranians, the regime's military buildup was seen as having prevented a US or Israeli attack."

According to Ervand Abrahamian, cited above, "Most politicians since the revolution have subscribed to varying degrees to economic populism. Some, such as former Presidents Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, were muted populists shy about tampering with social programs. Others, such as President Ahmadinejad, are out-and-out populists promising to 'bring the oil money to peoples' dining room tables' by further expanding social programs. No realist would contemplate drastic cuts in the safety net, though there are limits to the populism: Ahmadinejad, for instance, placed a quota on subsidized gasoline."

The reform tendencies of Rafsanjani and Khatami during their two eight-year presidencies (1989-2005) were frustrated in part by conservative clerical objections and also by not fighting forcefully enough, but certain reforms did take place, including a gradual relaxation of some of the restrictions on women imposed during the first decade of the Islamic revolution. Ahmadinejad reimposed some of these limitations (pressure from the mullahs was a partial factor) and Khamenei was responsible for others during the past four years. According to a pro-Mousavi article in the July 20 issue of The Nation by Robert Dreyfuss:

"University classes were re-segregated by gender. The law banning satellite dishes was enforced vigorously. The morality police resorted to patrolling the streets to ensure that women wore proper Islamic dress, and unmarried couples refrained from holding hands. This was but a part of Ahmadinejad's drive to return society to the early years of the Islamic revolution.

"Little wonder then that, in the run-up to the 2009 presidential election, young voters rallied behind Mir Hussein Mousavi, whose academic wife, the artist Zahra Rahnavard, spoke of the hijab becoming optional for women. Mousavi promised to disband the morality police and appoint women to important government jobs."

Some of these setbacks for women were the responsibility of Khamenei and at least one we know of was opposed by Ahmadinejad — the supreme leader's April 2007 order that the Tehran police harass women with "improper hijab," i.e., without, at minimum, a head cover or "modest dress." According to the BBC, ultra-conservatives had earlier sharply criticized the president because, said a detractor, "Mr Ahmadinejad is not that strict on this issue. He thinks we should not use force when acting on this issue so as a result hijab has become weaker."

On July 7, in his first post-election TV address, Ahmadinejad made overtures to the defeated bloc. The New York Times reported the next day that "using language that appeared aimed at mollifying the opposition, he promised that his new government would respect the youth, improve the economy and address unemployment.

"He also said that he opposed the use of security forces to deal with cultural issues, an indirect reference to the morality police, which the opposition candidates had pledged to dismantle. 'Cultural issues should be dealt with through cultural channels, and I am against security confrontations [police harassment],' he said. 'Social freedom is a principle. We have freedom in our country and need to expand it, although I am against extremism.'"

In the aftermath of a divisive election, Ayatollah Khamenei is making efforts to project a sense of national unity to counter the actions of any country trying to benefit from the nation's travail. In a July 6 speech he said: "If the officials of the Islamic republic have disputes with one another they are unanimous in standing against the enemy and in maintaining the independence of the country, and the enemy should know that it won't be able to create splits between the people of Iran."

5. THE 'STOLEN' ELECTION

Was the election stolen by Ahmadinejad? The Western mass media sure thinks so, even though it has presented no evidence beyond the circumstantial, and that's where most of us get our information.

But the Western media in general excoriates Iran on a daily basis, as it does to virtually every country that stands up to Uncle Sam, and it simply despises Ahmadinejad. Even a number of liberals, progressives and leftists see only the negative side of the Iranian dialectic in both its domestic politics and international perspective.

The Tehran government does not acknowledge widespread malfeasance. It seems probable to us that some votes for Ahmadinejad were padded and some for Mousavi may have been eliminated at one or another level of the counting process.

But we suspect he received enough votes to win the election, just a predicted in the public opinion poll of Iranian sentiment conducted by two respected American organizations three weeks before the voting. It showed Ahmadinejad winning 2-1, as we reported in the Activist Newsletter, June 17.

Mousavi publicly declared himself the winner by a large majority even before all the polling stations closed June 12. When the official vote total showed Ahmadinejad won big, he immediately charged that he was the victim of a colossal vote swindle. He still maintains this today, but doesn't seem to provide evidence to back up his allegation.

Paul Craig Roberts, writing for CounterPunch June 22, argues that Mousavi's premature claim of victory… is clearly a preemptive move, the purpose of which is to discredit any other outcome. There is no other reason to make such a claim."

Middle East correspondent Mahan Abedin, publishing in Asia Times July 9, agrees: "Mousavi's greatest mistake came immediately after the end of polling when he declared himself the outright winner. The implication was clear: a contradictory result would be automatically treated as fraudulent. This was the main trigger for the riots that followed. Mousavi then made one mistake after another by persisting with his fundamental position that the elections had been 'rigged'(without providing any convincing evidence) and refusing the solutions that were offered by mediators."

In a brilliant article for MRZine June 29, Mark Weisbrot — the co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington — points out that of the 700,000 people involved in conducting the elections, including poll watchers and other supporters of Mousavi, not one of them has come forward with evidence of fraud.

Weisbrot calculated that nearly 6 million votes had to be stolen from Mousavi and given to Ahmadinejad to deprive the opposition candidate of victory. After describing the thorough voter identification process, including finger prints, he then describes the elaborate electoral procedures he says were in place during the election:

"There are 14 people working at each polling place, in addition to an observer representing each candidate. Most polling places are schools or mosques; if the polling place is a school then the team of 14 people would include teachers. There are 2-4 representatives of the Guardian Council, and 2 from the local police. After the last votes are cast, the ballots are counted in the presence of the 14 people plus the candidates' representatives. All of them sign five documents that contain the vote totals. One of the documents goes into the ballot box; one stays with the leader of the local election team; and the others go to other levels of the electoral administration, including the Guardian Council and the Interior.

"The vote totals are then sent to a local center that also has representatives of the Guardian Council, Interior, and the candidates. They add up the figures from a number of ballot boxes, and then send them to Interior. In this election, the numbers were also sent directly to Interior from the individual polling places, in the presence of the 14-18 witnesses at the ballot box….

"It would appear that large scale fraud is extremely difficult, if not impossible, without creating an extensive trail of evidence. Indeed, if this election was stolen, there must be tens of thousands of witnesses — or perhaps hundreds of thousands — to the theft. Yet there are no media accounts of interviews with such witnesses." (The full article is at mrzine.monthlyreview.org/weisbrot290609.html)

On another matter — the question of the rapidity of the vote count — Weisbrot writes: " How long does it take to count 500-800 ballots at a polling place, with only the presidential candidates on the ballot? It could easily be done within the time that it took, as it was in 2005."

Several commentators have taken issue with the opposition claims that even the Guardian Council declared at least three million votes were stolen. Actually, the Council found that in several score cities and towns it turned out that there were three million more votes than registered voters. Then it explained that in Iran voters may deposit their ballot in any convenient polling location throughout the country, not just in their own local district as in the U.S. Workers voted near their jobs in other towns, vacationers and weekenders voted where they were, and so on.

On June 16, when Iran's leaders offered to conduct a partial recount of the votes, Mousavi rejected the offer, instead demanding a new election. After the opposition continued to reject a recount, the Guardian Council decided to do so anyway. On June 29, in front of TV cameras, randomly selected boxes containing approximately 10% of the vote were opened and counted. The totals were approximately the same as the original count. The Council rejected the charge of fraud and confirmed his victory.

Khamenei actively sought to unify all sides of the dispute throughout the turmoil that followed the election. As July approached most of the key figures seemed to have reconciled their differences. Mousavi continued to claim fraud and insist on a second ballot.

In a decisive development June 28, no less an oppositionist than Rafsanjani declared his support for the supreme leader and stated: "The developments following the presidential vote were a complex conspiracy plotted by suspicious elements with the aim of creating a rift between the people and the Islamic establishment and causing them to lose their trust in the system. Such plots have always been neutralized whenever the people have entered the scene with vigilance."

The next day, June 29, the Expediency Council headed by Rafsanjani instructed the three defeated candidates to "observe the law and resolve conflicts and disputes through legal channels." All the principals, including Mousavi, agreed. From the beginning the government urged Mousavi to take the matter to the courts, not the streets, but he had refused.

This is as close as we can come to putting together the election story on the basis of what is known so far. There are many mysteries and inexplicable behaviors that are yet to be revealed.

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6. DID WASHINGTON PLAY A ROLE?

There is no evidence that the United States played a direct role in the events following the Iranian election. The emphasis is upon "direct." We suspect President Obama was as surprised as President Ahmadinejad by the ferocity and size of the two weeks of post-election demonstrations in Tehran and other cities.

Obama's statement after the election that the U.S. is "not at all interfering in Iran's affairs," however, is untrue.

The protests were principally inspired by the belief that gross election irregularities caused Mousavi's defeat — a view that was originated and vigorously promoted by the defeated candidate himself from the moment he heard the verdict, after announcing to the world hours earlier that he had won. It's never been explained how he knew of his victory before all the polls closed. To our knowledge, Iran doesn't provide nationwide exit poll results throughout the voting day.

Disappointed and shocked supporters of the reform bloc took Mousavi at his word, and fought back until push turned into shove, and shove into tear gas, truncheons, and mass arrests.

We found it puzzling that in Farsi-speaking Iran so many of the signs we viewed on TV news were printed in English. We saw "Where's my vote?" all the time, as well as other signs and banners in a language we could read. A multitude of these signs began showing up the morning after the election and were clearly aimed at a foreign audience. We thought this strange.

It sure looked like an uprising for a brief while as the U.S. and British mass media took the international lead in fanning the flames they hoped would consume the "Holocaust-denier" and his "terrorist" accomplices.

Precisely why Mousavi decided to inspire the confrontations and keep them going as long as possible, especially when he didn't try to prove his case, is not yet known. Mousavi is not an American agent in mufti, though the CIA must wish he were.

Does this mean the U.S. has clean hands? Not by a long shot. Washington has been trying to arrange the overthrow of the Iranian government for many years. The constant anti-Iranian rhetoric emanating from the American political system and government leaders is just the visible part of a long-term destabilization program.

We won't begin at the beginning, having covered some of it earlier in this article, but will just concentrate on the last couple of years.

On June 25, as the Iranian protest demonstrations had just reached their peak, USA Today reported the following:

"The Obama administration is moving forward with plans to fund groups that support Iranian dissidents, records and interviews show, continuing a program that became controversial when it was expanded by President Bush.

"The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which reports to the secretary of state, has for the last year been soliciting applications for $20 million in grants to 'promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Iran,' according to documents on the agency's website. The final deadline for grant applications is June 30….

"Although the Obama administration has not sought to continue the Iran-specific grants in its 2010 budget, it wants a $15 million boost for the Near Eastern Regional Democracy Initiative, which has similar aims but does not specify the nations involved. Some of that money will be targeted at Iran, said David Carle, a spokesman for the appropriations subcommittee that oversees foreign affairs. Part of it is to expand access to information and communications through the Internet for Iranians," Carle said in an email….

"The State Department and USAID decline to name Iran-related grant recipients for security reasons. After Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a major expansion of the program in 2006… Congress eventually approved $66 million…. 'As the Iranian regime cracks down on its people, I strongly believe that we should be prepared to extend our hand in help and support to any Iranian civil society group that reaches out for it,' [said] Sen. Joseph Lieberman."

Writing for Truthout June 30, Steve Weissman revealed: "Since 2006, the State Department alone spent more than $200 million on the effort [to generate decisive protests within Iran]. The money went to its in-house Iran bashers and 'democracy-promoters,' the Voice of America's (VOA) Farsi language broadcasts, Radio Free Europe's round-the-clock Radio Farda and the secretive National Endowment for Democracy, which funded several other groups. This $200 million came on top of the $400 million that Congress allocated in 2007 for regime change in Iran, some of which went for the CIA's state-supported terrorism inside Iranian borders."

On June 30, CounterPunch produced an article by Esam Al-Amin titled, Has the CIA Been Caught in Iran's Cookie Jar, Again?, reporting:

"After Bush’s second inauguration in January 2005, the National Security Council had an intense internal debate regarding Iran. The conflict did not center on whether there should be a regime change in Iran, but rather, whether to employ soft or hard power to achieve it. Former Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld advocated a series of escalating military strikes, while former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair called for the use of soft power. Eventually, the president’s military advisors ended the debate when they cautioned Bush that with the deteriorating security situation in Iraq, engaging Iran militarily would be highly risky and draining for the U.S. armed forces.

"Between 2005-2009, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $400 million for State Department programs designed to 'promote democracy,' among other means of employing soft power in Iran. This was implemented, in part, by funding the activities of Iranian dissident groups. By 2008, Congress included money in the budget that would specifically 'go to software programmers to develop programs that thwart internet firewalls erected by the government of Iran,' and for a program to 'provide anti-censorship tools and services for the advancement of information freedom in closed societies.'

"The overt involvement of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and other U.S. Government-funded NGOs in supporting many of the groups and dissidents that led the colored and flowering 'revolutions,' is also well documented. The Orange (Ukraine), Rose (Georgia), Tulip (Kyrgyzstan), Cedar (Lebanon), Saffron (Burma) and now Green (Iran) 'revolutions' have involved mostly pro-Western groups or Western-favored individuals against nationalists."

Two days after the June 12 election, Paul Craig Roberts put together for CounterPunch a compilation of brief reports about Washington's anti-Iran activities in recent years:

"On May 16, 2007, the London Telegraph reported that Bush regime official John Bolton told the Telegraph that a U.S. military attack on Iran would 'be a last option after economic sanctions and attempts to foment a popular revolution had failed.'

"We are now witnessing in Tehran U.S. 'attempts to foment a popular revolution' in the guise of another CIA orchestrated 'color revolution.'

"It is possible that splits among the mullahs themselves brought about by their rival ambitions will aid and abet what the Telegraph (May 27, 2007) reported were 'CIA plans for a propaganda and disinformation campaign intended to destabilize, and eventually topple, the theocratic rule of the mullahs.' It is certainly a fact that the secularized youth of Tehran have played into the CIA’s hands….

"On May 23, 2007, Brian Ross and Richard Esposito reported on ABC News: 'The CIA has received secret presidential approval to mount a covert black operation to destabilize the Iranian government, current and former officials in the intelligence community tell... ABC News."

"On May 27, 2007, the London Telegraph independently reported: 'Mr. Bush has signed an official document endorsing CIA plans for a propaganda and disinformation campaign intended to destabilize, and eventually topple, the theocratic rule of the mullahs….

"On June 29, 2008, Seymour Hersh reported in the New Yorker: 'Late last year, Congress agreed to a request from President Bush to fund a major escalation of covert operations against Iran, according to current and former military, intelligence, and congressional sources. These operations, for which the President sought up to four hundred million dollars, were described in a Presidential Finding signed by Bush, and are designed to destabilize the country’s religious leadership.'"

There's more about destructive U.S. interference in Iranian affairs but we'll stop here. Suffice to say that the recent Pentagon reports about Iranian support for the Taliban in Afghan and the armed resistance in Iraq are lies aimed at undermining Iran. Tehran despises the Sunni Taliban and supported Bush's Afghan invasion. And, to its discredit, as far as we are concerned, the Iranian government evidently advised Shia Iraqis not to resist the U.S. invaders, as we will mention again below.

7. IRAN, AMERICA, ISRAEL AND THE FUTURE

Before getting into this, and in the interests of "full disclosure," here's some clarity about where our analysis is coming from.

Given our own left political views, we are critical in principle of theocratic regimes and conservative cultural practices as now exist in Iran, and believe that Ahmadinejad has spoken unwisely on several occasions, particularly his comments about the Holocaust and some of his remarks about Israel. We deplore the 30-year repression of the left, and are unaware of any opposition to this practice from the reformers. Our political sympathies lean toward the remaining left, factional and weak as it is.

We supported the overthrow of the U.S.-installed monarchy by the broad forces that fought the revolution led by the Islamic movement headed by Ayatollah Khomeini, the removal of Iran from subordination to the United States, and the Tehran government's anti-imperialist policies. Many progressive Americans such as myself would prefer to see a number of social and political changes in Iran, but believe that Tehran's internal affairs are strictly a matter for the Iranian people to determine, certainly not the U.S. imperial superpower and its satellites. Our task in America is to correct our own country's faults and join in the defense of Iran's sovereignty and independence when it is threatened by our own government. Now back to the story:

Iran is not a military danger to America, Israel or any other country. In its modern history, Iran has experienced a long occupation by British colonialism, a political coup organized by U.S. imperialism, decades of painful sanctions, an invasion by neighboring Iraq, and Yankee subversion, but was not the aggressor.

Teheran's development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes is legitimate and within the confines of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel, with some 200 nuclear weapons — protected by America and its entire arsenal — claims Iran is an "existential threat." This is nonsense.

Tel Aviv insists Iran must be stopped by any means necessary from producing a nuclear weapons and delivery system, which it says will take five more years to produce. That possibly means yet another unjust war. The National Intelligence Estimate compiled by the 16 U.S. spy agencies reports Iran does not now have a nuclear weapons program. The new chief of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (who was supported for the post by the U.S.) said July 4 that he had no evidence Iran was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Even if the Tehran government ever did produce a nuclear weapon for defensive purposes, an intention it denies, it is well aware that preparing to initiate a nuclear attack would be tantamount to signing its own death warrant.

Iran has several enemies, not just the U.S. and Israel. Some Sunni Arab states within the U.S. orbit are distressed by the presence of a powerful Persian Shi'ite country in the region.

Semi-feudal Saudi Arabia, Washington's oldest satellite in the Middle East, was strongly hoping for the downfall of the Ahmadinejad regime. According to M. K. Bhadrakumar, mentioned earlier, "Riyadh's fond hopes of witnessing the Iranian regime debilitated by a protracted crisis have been dashed." He noted that "the state-controlled Saudi Arabian media launched unprecedented, vicious personal attacks on both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad."

On the other hand, Bhadrakumar wrote, "Meir Dagan, head of Israel's Mossad [spy agency], let it be known that a win by Iranian opposition candidate Mousavi in the presidential election on June 12 would have spelled 'big problems' for Israel. He explained: 'The world, and we, already know Ahmadinejad. If the reformist candidate Mousavi had won, Israel would have had a more serious problem, because it would need to explain to the world the danger of the Iranian threat, since Mousavi is perceived in the international arena as a moderate element."

A June 25 article in The New York Times under a Cairo dateline reported: " The rancorous dispute over Iran's presidential election could turn into a win-win for Arab leaders aligned with Washington who in the past have complained bitterly that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was destabilizing the region and meddling in Arab affairs, political analysts and former officials around the region said. The good-news thinking goes like this: With Mr. Ahmadinejad remaining in office, there is less chance of substantially improved relations between Tehran and Washington, something America's Arab allies feared would undermine their interests."

Much of this worry derives from the fact that Washington's unjust invasions of secular and Sunni Ba'athist Iraq and Sunni Taliban-controlled Afghanistan have neutralized Iran's two enemy neighbors, providing Tehran some influence in now Shi'ite-controlled Baghdad.

Obviously, should both these strategically located oil-rich modern states with majority Shia populations bond closely over time they would represent an alliance that could disrupt America's geostrategic intention to extend its hegemony over the entire Persian Gulf region.

The June 24 Christian Science Monitor reported that as U.S. troops leave Iraq, Washington is urging Arab states within its orbit to draw closer to the Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki, "a Shi'ite whom they have been reluctant to work with because of their perception he's close to Iran but who is, nevertheless, an Arab like them." The paper quotes Defense Secretary Robert Gates saying that "The embrace of Iraq by its fellow Gulf states will help contain the ambitions of Iran."

America's interest now is to restore the balance of power that existed during the rivalry between Iraq and Iran when Saddam Hussein's regime presided in Baghdad, only this time to make sure that the Iraqi regime is controlled by the United States from its colossal new fortress of an embassy in the Green Zone. Recalling the devastation of the 1980-88 war, Tehran justly fears a strong Iraq now dominated by Washington just across its long western border.

The Iranian government is also concerned about the possibility that the Obama Administration will make a deal in Afghanistan that would eventually allow the more "reasonable" wing of the fanatical Taliban to get back into power, reopening the old threat on its eastern border.

Most Americans are unaware that Iran provided help to the U.S. in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran's main effort was in Iraq where, it is said, Tehran sought to convince the Shi'ite leadership to refrain from joining the national liberation struggle against the American invader. This has allowed the Pentagon, unable to actually defeat the Iraqi resistance, to settle for a stalemate rather than a probable defeat from combined Sunni-Shi'ite urban guerrilla warfare.

Iranian leaders correctly calculated that the invasion would eventually result in the Shi'ite majority finally assuming power in a country historically controlled by a Sunni minority. They also expected that in return for their help, the U.S. would not contest Iranian influence in the new Iraq. On this they were quite wrong.

The U.S. recognizes that a violent regime change is not possible in Iran. Washington evidently has not yet given up on bringing about a pro-U.S. government in Tehran through a "soft" power transition such as the "color" revolutions in countries situated in Russia's "near abroad" — but this, too, may not be viable.

At this point the Obama Administration seems to be settling for a two-track effort to make Tehran more amenable to Washington's diktat, or to increase Iran's isolation if it can't. One track is the New Beginning — less hostility, a little (probably too little) give in return for take, patient negotiations and, in extremis, maybe even an apology for 1953, but that might be going too far. The other track includes continued wooing of dissidents; discouraging other nations from befriending Iran (as Clinton seeks to do in Latin America); putting an off limits sign at the Iraq border; threatening to unleash Israel; and the piece de resistance, if it ever works — building a coalition of U.S. and Sunni Arab nations dedicated to keeping Iran "contained," and weakening it further if possible.

A Tehran preoccupied by internal political controversy that may linger a while may be perceived as an opportune moment for the U.S. to form an anti-Iran axis in the region. This could be one reason why Washington is becoming anxious to resolve the Palestinian conundrum, even if it must bulldoze the far-right Tel Aviv regime kicking and screaming to the conference table. An agreement for a Palestinian state — even if it takes forever to materialize in practice — could kick-start an anti-Iranian coalition possibly composed of such U.S. political dependencies as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, possibly Kuwait and a few lesser Arab nations. And, because of a Palestinian "settlement" of sorts, a suddenly pristine Israel could be invited to join the coalition of the more-than-willing.

This is where President Ahmadinejad returns to the picture. Described as a vulgar bumpkin by the American mass media, the Iranian president is an intelligent, skilled and tough politician and national leader. He knows it may be more challenging to govern during his second term, and is familiar with the danger posed by the U.S. and the possibility of a hostile regional alliance.

Internally, Ahmadinejad has three options: 1. To sharply increase political repression and govern with an iron hand (this is what much of the Western media predicts will happen); 2. to carry on as during his first term; or 3. to make overtures and some concessions to the moderate reformers and the remaining Islamic left. What will he do?

We do not believe Ahmadinejad will select the first option — more repression. He could go for the second option — business as usual. But we think he will either select the third option — concessions — or more likely a combination of two and three. And we think Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will approve.

Externally, Ahmadinejad must be aware that under present political conditions Iran probably will be attacked the day it produces a deliverable nuclear weapon. Iran wants to establish that it has the right to construct nuclear power facilities. Given the fact that Israel is in major violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and harbors hundreds of nuclear weapons of its own, Iran probably feels it has a right to build a bomb as well.

But it may decide, as did Japan, to obtain the knowledge and wherewithal to weaponize through constructing a peaceful nuclear power apparatus as it is now doing, but not to produce weapons. This may in fact be Iran's intention. I could be wrong, but it would be a huge bargaining chip in negotiations, in return for which Tehran would deserve something just as big.

In terms of the U.S., the great majority of the Iranian people — conservative, moderate, and left — want their country to remain completely free of Washington's domination. They will unite and fight for it. At the same time, Iran will benefit a great deal by the removal of American sanctions. While keeping an eye out to prevent U.S. intervention in its affairs, it may be fruitful for the Tehran government to have improved interaction with Washington without conceding its anti-imperialist politics, support for Palestine, or the development of closer relations with Shia Iraq and left countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia and others. At this stage it's as obvious as a mastodon on the front lawn that Uncle Sam will demand that Tehran stop aiding Hamas and Hezbollah, which could be the deal-breaker.

There are many pitfalls ahead for Iran as it prepares for either fruitful talks or a tense showdown with U.S.-Israel; it's a toss up which it will be, and we incline toward pessimism. The Obama Administration says it wants constructive talks and to resolve certain problems, so let's see. But all of this is for the future to decide, and for advocates of peace, national independence, and the equality of nations to watch carefully as it unfolds, and to act politically in defense of those three principles should they be violated, as they have been repeatedly by our country for many years.